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1. Introduction
Pharmaceutical innovation is particularly challenging (Fernandez et al., 2012), with
the failure rates of R&D projects escalating, the costs of R&D expanding, and the
time taken to move from drug patent to market launch increasing (Pammolli et al.,
2011). Recently, the withdrawal of high-profile products because of safety concerns
(e.g. Vioxx, Avandia) and questions over the efficacy of blockbuster drugs have led to
calls for increased regulation and scrutiny (Kirsch, 2009, Goldacre, 2012). Moreover,
pharmaceutical firms have struggled to improve their stagnant levels of novel drug
approvals while investment in R&D has increased, leading to a prominent debate in
recent years about how to address the industry’s productivity crisis (Munos, 2009,
Pammolli et al., 2011). As performance has declined, investors have become dissa-
tisfied and stock prices have fallen (Fernandez et al., 2012). However, even in this
climate, investment in “biotech firms”1 has boomed (Huggett et al., 2011) as estab-
lished pharmaceutical firms continue to sign large numbers of deals to access pro-
mising drugs from these younger, smaller firms (Munos, 2009).
While some have cautioned that biotech investors are being rewarded for activities
that generate limited benefits to society (Lazonic and Tulum, 2011), in recent years,
new market entrants have been contributing an increasing proportion of new drugs
reaching approval (Kneller, 2010). As a result, a view has emerged (albeit controver-
sially—see Pisano, 2006, 2011; DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007; Lex, 2010) that small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) can outperform large firms because of their
specialization, flexibility, and creativity. Corporate advisors have even begun to sug-
gest that the large pharmaceutical firms that have dominated the industry in the past
should leave early-stage drug R&D to more “cost effective” SMEs (Baum et al., 2010).
How the increasing amounts of capital flowing into the biotech sector during an
ongoing change in the division of innovative labor will affect productivity is far from
certain, given the complex web of organizational interactions at work. Yet it is clear
that where populations of SMEs have emerged in different countries, they have
maintained investor interest to different extents, despite their common exposure
to the major challenges facing the global drug discovery endeavor. In particular,
the UK sector has traditionally had lower investments in each firm than has been
the case in the USA (Bains, 2006), and more recently, the UK firms also faced
comparatively more reticent investors (Smith et al., 2009). However, as the article
1As we explain further in Section 3, this article is concerned with therapeutics firms founded in the
UK since 1980. Many of these firms are not focused on modern biotechnologies, for example, as
classified by OECD 2005. We observe that “biotech” has become established as a colloquial term for
small loss-making life science firms (e.g. Anon (1998) who in the Financial Times notes “investors
tend to brand any smaller loss-making business that develops drugs or medical devices a biotech
company”). These may be focused on a variety of application areas (drugs, diagnostics, industrial
processing); however, this article will focus on therapeutics and uses the term “biotech” in this
colloquial sense.
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will show, this weakening of investor support follows an initial period when a
number of institutional innovations in the finance sector favored the growth of
the UK biotech SMEs.
Using the UK sector as our reference site, this article explores the following
questions: How have the UK’s biotech firms been financed, and how have changes
in R&D and finance influenced the structure of the UK sector? Finally, how have
biotech firms performed in drug R&D during these changes?
Using empirical evidence over three decades, we will advance the argument that
scale effects, related to the amount of money invested in firms and the number of
firms in the sector, are important not only for emerging drug development firms but
also for the viability of firms specializing in SME investment, as the size of the sector
allows costs and risks to be spread and shared. Drawing on Chandler’s Scale and
Scope framework (1990) we interpret the rise and relative decline of the UK biotech
sector in terms of scale imperatives interacting across sectors.
Using Chandler to understand the financing of networks of small scientific firms
may seem surprising, given his focus on large manufacturing firms. Indeed some
have argued that the shift in industrial organization from large firms to networks of
organizations challenges his framework (e.g. Langlois, 2004 and Lamoreaux et al.,
2003), and may amount to a falsification sufficient to displace it (see the insightful
discussion in Langlois, 2003). However, while one implication of Chandler’s explan-
ation is that under certain circumstances industrial organizations move from small
firms to large firms, when those circumstances change, industrial organizations can
move from large to small. Moreover, we suggest those changes in circumstances can
be driven by the dynamics of scale in another sector, in ways that are entirely con-
sistent with Chandler’s theory. The article highlights these scale imperatives and their
interactions among the key actors in funding and undertaking drug discovery: the
biotech SMEs, the large pharmaceutical firms, venture capital (VC) funds and insti-
tutional investors.
These systemic inter-sectoral or even inter-industry effects are important because
the type of financing a firm receives influences its strategic behavior and perform-
ance. A financialization process that encourages short-term investment and short-
term strategies may distract firms from developing innovative products (Lazonick
and Tulum, 2011; Andersson et al., 2010) and even inhibit the emergence of new
industries (Mazzucato, 2011, Bains, 2009).2 Until now it has been difficult to explore
the long-term impacts of changes in funding because of the lack of comprehensive
long-term data. Previous analysis in biotech, for example, has focused on subsamples
such as stock market–listed companies, or samples that blend national figures,
2Indeed, Bains notes in his book on the European Venture Capital industry and its influence on
biotech firms that “The requirement for VC cash and the demands of the VC business model shape
everything in the modern biotechnology industry. It is a principal contention of this book this is a
bad thing” (Bains 2009:12).
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overlook private firms, merge boundaries (e.g. between therapeutics with research
tools and diagnostics), or cover short periods (Smith et al., 2009; Editorial, 2010;
Kneller, 2010; Huggett et al., 2011). In this article, we use a new comprehensive data
set to show changing patterns of interaction between investors and investees,
which allows us to explore how the selection environment influences the gener-
ation of capabilities and hence the evolution of firms and sectors (Zollo and
Winter, 2002).
The coevolution between firms, industries, and adjacent institutions has been
explored before in other sectors (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999; Djelic and Ainamo,
1999; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000 and Henderson and Ithai, 2004) and by
Murmann (2003) in the pharmaceutical sector. Our work provides an alternative
analysis, exploring some of the dynamics of development, that is complementary to
formal coevolutionary analysis.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our framework (Chandler, 1990;
as iteratively advanced in Nightingale 2000a, b, and Nightingale et al., 2011), and the
key characteristics of the four actors listed above. Section 3 discusses the methods
used to undertake the study. Section 4 describes key trends in the financing of the UK
biotech SMEs across three decades, the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Section 5 then
compares the performance of SMEs founded in each of these decades, using the
key metrics of the number of SMEs supporting development of one or more prod-
ucts passed P.II trials, and the time taken to achieve this. Section 6 discusses the
results and their implications for both theory and policy, while Section 7 draws
conclusions.
2. Direct and indirect Chandlerian influences on biotech R&D
In the literature on the theory of the firm, firms can either be seen to indicate the
existence of market failures, where transaction costs prevent markets from working
efficiently, or as organizational successes that outperform markets (Lazonick, 1991).
A key stream in this later work, going back to Babbage (1835), Lardner (1850), and
J. M. Clark (1923), focuses on how firm-based coordination can outperform markets
by better utilizing specialized resources to avoid wasteful idleness.
Chandler (1990) highlighted how the potential economies of scale and scope in
production and distribution that come from increased size or sharing of processes
only generate actual cost advantages if the flows of materials were managed to main-
tain high levels of capacity utilization. When utilization levels fell, diseconomies
rapidly set in as fixed costs were much higher (Chandler, 1990: 24). As a result,
profits and costs are closely related to “the actual amount processed within a specific
time,” which is dependent on “both size-rated capacity—and speed—the intensity at
which capacity is used” (ibid), i.e. the throughput of work done.
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As well as improvements in efficiency, managerial coordination improved firms’
effectiveness by giving them the Schumpeterian dynamic capabilities needed to move
in and out of expanding and declining markets (Chandler, 1990:36). Chandler’s
theory has been discussed in detail elsewhere (Teece, 1993) and modified versions
of it have been applied to investment banks (Nightingale, 2000a), pharmaceutical
firms (Nightingale, 2000b), retailing, telecoms, elevators, and financial services
(Nightingale et al., 2003), as well as project-based organizations in general
(Nightingale et al., 2011). In its modified form, relative economic performance is
explained by static efficiency and dynamic effectiveness. Static efficiency relates to the
extent to which high fixed cost investments, improved capacity utilization and speed
of processing influence the actual amount processed within a specific time, and hence
the final balance between fixed and variable costs. Dynamic effectiveness relates to a
firms’ ability to move in and out of markets that provide higher value and allow these
higher fixed costs to be spread.
Put in these terms, the theory does not imply that industrial dynamics inevitably
moves from small firms to large firms, even if Chandler himself sometimes suggested
that it did. Indeed, large firms are not mentioned in the synthesis above. Instead, the
theory has a more general application, as it implies that if the conditions that allow
scale and scope economies to develop then change, so to will the balance between
large and small firms. Moreover, it implies that the economic imperatives toward
improved capacity utilization can influence firms in other sectors by changing these
conditions. We explore this process in more detail below, focusing on the cross-
sectoral interactions involved in the financing of the UK biotech sector, beginning
with an introduction to each of the major sectors that interact in the financing of
drug development: VC, institutional investors, pharmaceutical firms, and biotech
firms.
2.1 VC funds as scale intensive Chandlerian firms
VC is “the process of external equity finance provision by professional investors in a
new or young (i.e. early stage) company to create new assets for the primary purpose
of reaping substantial economic gain through a market flotation [initial public
offering (IPO)] or trade sale” (BVCA-NESTA, 2009). From a Chandlerian perspec-
tive, VC funds can be seen as a pipeline operating over a fixed period of time
(typically 10 years during the period studied), containing a portfolio of investee
firms, that are chosen from a stream of high potential investment opportunities by
selective investment managers. The managers then transform these opportunities
into high-value firms, by providing staged equity investments and managerial sup-
port (Sapienza et al., 1996). As the investee firms grow, new rounds of funding are
typically required, which can be syndicated to diversify portfolio risks. Investee firms
eventually “exit” through a trade sale (acquisition), or an IPOs, which allows the VC
partnership to realize the value it has created.
Buying big into biotech 907
 at Sussex Language Institute on A
ugust 27, 2013
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The returns from this style of investing are highly skewed (Booth and Salehizadeh,
2011) with the majority of profits coming from the top quartile of VC funds. Within
funds most investments either fail, or make poor returns, with a small number
generating large enough returns to cover the rest of the portfolio and (ideally) satisfy
investors (Murray and Marriott, 1998, Murray, 1999).
The fixed costs of the organizational infrastructure needed to find, support, and
sell a portfolio of investee firms make VC a scale sensitive sector. Typically 2% of
the fund goes toward covering these managerial costs each year, which accumulates
over the life of a fund. For a small fund, of say £25 million, 2% will not pay for a
viable investment team. Small funds therefore generally generate lower returns be-
cause they either spend too little to attract strong management or spend a dispro-
portionate amount of the fund on management, which can have a damaging effect on
final returns (Murray, 1999; Murray and Marriott, 1998; Ja¨a¨skela¨inen et al., 2007).
Larger scale also allows funds to diversify their risk more efficiently across a larger
portfolio, and crucially allows them to make follow-on investments when new shares
are issued in investee firms. This allows them to maintain their ownership share, and
ensure their returns do not get diluted by deeper pocketed coinvestors. Finally, scale
may also provide a signaling effect for syndication deals, help to attract and retain
key staff, and attract high-quality firms to the portfolio, as time-constrained fund
managers may see small size as a signal of low quality.
The viability of a VC sector therefore depends on a sizable “deal flow” of high
potential opportunities worth investing in, which allow VCs to specialize in a par-
ticular business area, investors willing to take on the high risks involved, skilled
managers and external advisors able to add value to investee firms, and exit markets
capable of generating the high returns needed and cover the high fixed costs this
involves. To generate the sorts of returns investors seek, this system has to generate
substantial increases in the value of the equity stake taken in the successful investee
firms in a portfolio. If these levels of returns cannot be captured, funds will be unable
to attract new investors and raise additional funds. Hence, VC is an extremely ex-
pensive source of risk capital for the investee firm, only suitable for a tiny minority of
firms, and VCs are demanding investors (BVCA-NESTA, 2009; Bains, 2009) who can
only operate when exit routes are available and place intense pressure on their
investee firms to increase in value during a short period (Bains, 2009; Lazonick
and Tulum, 2011, Fernandez et al., 2012).
2.2 Institutional investors and economies of scale
Institutional investors manage diverse portfolios of investments on behalf of clients.
Examples include pension funds and investment trusts. Institutional investors are
important for the SME biotech sector as they invest in VC funds, indirectly support-
ing early-stage firms, and more directly, they provide funding for IPOs and subse-
quent stock market financing events (among a wide range of other investments).
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By investing in stocks as they come to the stock markets, generalist or specialist
investors who cannot hold their investments over the full duration that therapeutic
products take to pass through the R&D process are able to take ownership from VC
funds and then pass ownership on to other investors, as they require (Andersson
et al., 2010). As we will explore in Section 4, the emergence of a VC sector and new
stock markets in the UK created a “funding escalator” with finance accessible for
firms at different stages of development (BIGT, 2009). Finance in the UK is centred
on the City of London, which is an international market (Kynaston, 2011) that, in
common with the USA, but unlike much of Europe, has a funded pension system
(i.e. pensions are not paid from firms’ current earnings). This has generated a large
pool of investment capital and a large number of specialized institutional investors to
manage it. As a result, institutional ownership of equities is more significant than
elsewhere, and can reach 80% for large firms (Golding, 2001:23).
In Chandlerian terms, institutional investors can be seen as pipelines that process
financial contracts rather than physical materials (Nightingale, 2000b). The profit-
ability of these investments is determined by their size, margin, risk, and liquidity.
The organizational and technical systems that draw in financial resources, transform
them, market them to customers, evaluate their risks and performance, and ensure
regulatory compliance are expensive. The costs are fixed in the sense of a fixed cost of
production (i.e. not being a variable cost), but not in the sense of being stable or
unchanging over time. Indeed funds’ costs are compounded over the life of a con-
tract, and can accumulate to have a substantial impact on the final performance of a
long-term product such as a pension.
As a consequence, the relative economic performance of institutional investors
depends on spreading these accumulating fixed costs, typically achieved by increasing
funds under management, which drives fee income, and increases capacity utilization
and throughput over a fixed period. Thus, institutional investors have become large:
by 1999 the top five asset managers had funds under management larger than the
combined Gross Domestic Product of France and the UK (Golding, 2001). The flow
of capital into and out of these large funds reflects their relative performance com-
pared with other funds (and indices), which, given their overlapping holdings, can be
disproportionately influenced by seemingly marginal investments. This creates herd
behavior, short termism, risk aversion (Haldane, 2011), and an emphasis on the
predictable profitability and liquidity of easy-to-understand investments. Liquidity
is particularly important given the scale of the funds, with a £500 million fund
typically divided into a portfolio of 80–90 investments.3 Individual investments are
therefore large enough that it becomes prohibitively costly to hold and eventually
3These will typically be divided between bonds, equities, real estate, and short-term money market
securities, with a small proportion in alternative investments, such as private equity, hedge funds,
property, and VC.
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move out of illiquid positions, which is one reason why institutional investors are less
interested in investing in medium-sized and small firms.
2.3 Pharmaceutical firms as Chandlerian firms
Large incumbent pharmaceutical firms are classic Chandlerian firms that can exploit
the scale and scope economies emerging through the coordinated integration of high
fixed cost R&D and global marketing and sales operations (Nightingale, 2000a).
These high fixed costs are spread over a pipeline of potentially high-value drug
discovery projects that need to succeed in sufficient numbers to generate enough
profits to reinvest in future innovation and satisfy institutional investors. While
economies of scale and scope are seen (to a point) in parts of drug development
(Danzon et al., 2005), overall productivity is declining as the output of new drugs has
not kept up with increasing R&D spending (Pammolli et al., 2011).
A novel drug takes an average of 14 years to progress through this pipeline from
patent to regulatory approval with estimated costs (including paying for failures)
somewhere between several hundred million and several billion dollars (Munos and
Chin, 2011, Pammolli et al., 2011). Only a fraction of drug R&D projects reach the
clinic, with success rates of 1.3–19.7% depending on therapeutic field. As a result,
large firms build high-fixed cost capabilities to effectively find, evaluate, and exploit
innovative drug targets, avoid late-stage clinical failures, and direct projects toward
profitable markets (Hopkins et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2009; O’Neill and Hopkins,
2012). The capacity utilization of the drug development pipeline is maintained with
internal R&D projects, in-licensing of projects from other therapeutics developers,
and increasingly by accessing projects through mergers and acquisitions (Munos,
2009). Large pharmaceutical firms make substantial bets of £1–7 billion annually per
firm (Rafols et al., 2012) in large numbers of new drug candidates to hedge against
high failure rates. Throughput is increased (in theory) by speeding up development
using automation, information and communication technologies, miniaturization,
and new biotechnologies to gain scale and scope economies in R&D, which allows
firms to learn to avoid time-consuming experimental dead ends (Nightingale, 2000).
The speed of development (throughput) is important because patent lives are fixed,
and each day of delay might cost £2–5 million for a blockbuster drug in lost revenues
(O’Neill, 2012; Pammolli et al., 2011).
Hence, some pharmaceutical firms seek economies by increasing the efficiency of
their internal “R&D engines” (Garnier, 2008) by acting as systems integrators, spend-
ing hundreds of millions of dollars a year sourcing subsystems through corporate
alliances, and integrating them to generate technology platforms in areas such as
genomics and combinatorial chemistry that they hope will improve performance
(Hopkins et al., 2007). However, these investments (particularly prominent
from the 1990s onward) have not yet yielded significant productivity improvements
(Pammolli et al., 2011) and may have negatively impacted productivity by
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encouraging reductionist, scalable research at the expense of lower throughput, more
tacit-knowledge–based approaches (Scannell et al., 2012). These disappointing results
have led firms to rely more on projects from SMEs (Kneller, 2010)4 to maintain
capacity, and in recent years, externally sourced molecules have had higher success
rates than internally originated molecules (Danzon et al., 2005). As a result, large
pharmaceutical firms have faced pressure from their investors to “exit early-stage
R&D and create value” for shareholders (Baum et al., 2010) as mentioned in Section 1.
2.4 Biotech SMEs and the time cost of capital as a Chandlerian imperative
Early biotech firms such as Genentech exploited recombinant DNA technology and
antibody technology to produce novel drugs or make established treatments (e.g.
insulin) in new ways. While some of these early biotechs built themselves into fully
integrated firms that could compete directly with incumbent large pharmaceutical
firms, most have found this difficult (Pisano, 2006; Sharp and Senker, 1999;
Orsenigo, 1989; Kaplan and Murray, 2008). Instead, waves of biotech start-ups con-
tinue to emerge to exploit new biotechnologies, often creating dense networks of
alliances with pharmaceutical firms and other biotech SMEs (Pammolli and
Riccaboni, 2002; Powell et al., 1996). Biotech firms’ drugs are more successful
when developed in alliances with more experienced firms (Danzon et al., 2005),
and projects in firms with fewer alliances seem more likely to fail (Powell et al.,
1996). Rather than growing into integrated pharmaceutical firms, biotech SMEs now
often specialize in particular stages of development, therapeutic areas, or on emer-
ging technological approaches, with many building technical capabilities that they
exploit over multiple projects, both internally and/or externally with partners
(Hopkins et al., forthcoming; Nightingale et al., 2011).
The drugs in biotech firms’ pipelines often originate in upstream public sector
research. Biotech firms access research, evaluate and filter opportunities before de-
veloping viable projects to the next stage. In doing so, they act as “middlemen”
between the science base and downstream incumbent firms with global market
access (Owen, 2001; Stuart et al., 2007). They out-license their products in exchange
for payments and/or royalty streams (Rothaermel, 2001). The resulting networked
mode of innovation has become a defining feature of the biotech sector (Powell et al.,
1996; Powell et al., 2005).
For a research-intensive biotech firm that does not have any products, access to
external finance is essential. Drug development is unsuited to debt finance because of
the high risks and lack of collateral, particularly as the book value of the firm will
reduce as funds are spent developing projects that do not increase the value of the
4Pharmaceutical firms have of course followed a range of strategies to maintain their profitability
from focusing on emerging markets (Sanofi) to counter-balancing high-risk R&D with lower-risk
consumer products (Glaxosmithkline); however, our focus here is on economies of scale and scope
related to therapeutic R&D.
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firm until regulatory milestones in clinical trials are passed (Andersson et al., 2010;
Hopkins, 2012). As a consequence, biotech firms often rely on professional equity
investors, such as VC funds.
As highlighted earlier, this equity investment amounts to an extremely high fixed
cost of production because of the high time cost of capital for VC investors, for
example, who expect annual returns of 20–70% (Hopkins, 2012; Bains, 2009). While
this is a fixed cost of production in the sense it is needed to undertake production, it
is not fixed in the sense that it remains the same over time. Instead, the cost of capital
increases through time, creating a Chandlerian imperative toward improving
throughput and getting projects completed as quickly as possible.
The force of this imperative can be seen in Figure 1, which is based on amalga-
mated data from three UK VC-backed biotechs founded in the 1990s. It shows how
and when these firms accessed VC funding (totalling £45 million each) over a series
of funding rounds, and the expected returns at different stages implied by a 50%
compound annual growth rate—demanded by some VCs. At this rate, firms with 6
years of VC investment totalling £23 million would have to return over £80 million
to investors at exit to generate the required returns, while retaining VC support for a
further 2 years (for example, to undertake another phase of clinical trials) would
require another round of investment (£11.5 million) and raise expected returns to
more than £200 million. Another round of similar size and another 2 years might
raise expectations of a return greater than £470 million. With these sorts of require-
ments, even technically successful firms that IPO for large amounts of money relative
to cash invested can be poor investments. As a result, exits that may seem premature
from a firm’s perspective might be rational for a VC fund.
Given these costs biotech firms need to increase the throughput of their R&D
pipeline to develop at least one high-value therapeutic project within the timeframe
required by investors. In theory, this involves exploiting their nimble organizational
structures and advantages in fast decision making to effectively (a) find target drug
candidates for valuable markets and (b) efficiently reduce the number of experimen-
tal dead ends that need to be explored to advance these drug candidates through
clinical trials. However this is only an advantage if this swiftness offsets biotech firms’
much higher cost of capital (established pharmaceutical firms can issue corporate
bonds with coupon rates of55% at present).
In summary, three sectors interact closely with biotech SMEs in the UK and each
is influenced by Chandlerian imperatives, which shape their investment behavior and
interactions: VC funds need high returns to satisfy their investors, and use expensive
staff and demanding investment plans to achieve these, generating high fixed costs;
institutional investors benefit from scale efficiencies but to do so must avoid invest-
ing in small, low liquidity, hard-to-understand firms; while, pharmaceutical firms
need to access external drug candidates to feed their pipelines amidst declining R&D
productivity, but nonetheless have strategic preferences regarding which externally
sourced drugs they wish to fund and develop. After setting out our methods, in
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Section 3 and Section 4 we will show how interactions between these investors have
influenced the growth and development of the UK biotech industry. A key focus of
the account is the consequence of firms from these different sectors not achieving
Chandlerian economies from exploiting emerging biotech opportunities.
3. Research setting, data, and limitations of the method
To address our research questions, we have identified as fully as possible the popu-
lation of firms in the UK SME biotech sector and followed their financings and
research performance over the 30-year history of the sector. We identified 247
firms, including both public (i.e. stock market listed) and private (i.e. unquoted)
firms, as well as those firms that have and have not successfully advanced their
therapeutic assets. The data set was built from a range of historical sources that
name SMEs, to avoid survivor bias (Cassar, 2004), and then cross checked with
the Pharmaprojects database (see www.pharmaprojects.com), which was used to
screen these for all current and historically active UK firms owning one or more
projects. This is necessary because Pharmaprojects does not retain the country of
origin of acquired firms or projects that have changed hands. Pharmaprojects is an
industry standard database that is widely used for large scale longitudinal studies (see
Munos, 2009; Pammolli et al., 2011). Only including firms contained in pharma-
projects excludes a small number of recently founded firms that have not yet
500
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Figure 1 VC investment and expected returns based on the time cost of capital. Source:
Hopkins (2012) based on author’s own data.
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acquired or developed projects or are new. No firms founded in 2009 and proclaim-
ing to be engaged in drug discovery qualified, for example, and we find few for 2008.
Hence, there is likely to be some “right censoring” in the data set and so conclusions
are drawn with caution about population trends in the period 2005–2009.5
New entrants are defined as SMEs founded in the UK between 1980 and 2009,
actively engaged in drug discovery and development activities related to at least one
proprietary therapeutics project of which they own rights to (either wholly or in
part). Firms involved only in fee-for-service work are excluded. Activity at any stage
of drug discovery/development qualifies but firms active only in sales and marketing,
distribution or manufacture are excluded. While most firms included in the data set
are independently founded, the study has not excluded spin-outs from larger entities.
Not-for-profit entities such as medical charities are excluded, although their spin-out
firms are not.
The definition of therapeutics includes biopharmaceuticals, synthetic chemical
drugs, including novel reformulations, as well as drug delivery methods, and prod-
ucts based on whole cells (e.g. stem cell therapies) vaccines or other biologics, but
excludes firms developing diagnostics and medical devices who do not develop
therapeutics (or reformulations thereof). Figure 2 shows the sources used to build
the sample and the numbers of new firms founded each year. Data sources are
indicated by year of publication (where these are one-offs, although they may them-
selves rely on a host of prior sources) or by their period of service provision (for
databases/ directories).
3.1 Classification of funding routes
Throughout the period studied, biotech firms have predominantly adopted a “for-
ward integrator” strategy (Hopkins, 2012) whereby firms are founded to develop
drugs, and are built up from early-stage R&D toward the market.6 Such firms require
external equity investment over extended periods (1–2 decades is common) and for
each firm we have identified their funding route. The choice of funding sources
available to firms has expanded over time but can initially be categorized as deriving
from revenue, equity or debt (Patel et al., 2008; Hopkins, 2012). We are principally
concerned with sources of external investment for equity, particularly VC funds,
institutional investors, and pharmaceutical firms, who are the main sources of capital
for the sector (Ernst &Young, 2011; Huggett et al., 2011). All 247 UK firms were
tracked through funding route-maps (see Figures 4, 5, 9 in Section 4) from
5In fact, other data sources suggest relatively few biotech firms (qualifying or otherwise) have been
founded recently due to poor economic conditions in the UK (BIS 2011) or more widely (Ernst and
Young 2010).
6One notable exception being Shire Pharmaceuticals Plc that started with a sales operation and
eventually integrated backwards by acquiring discovery stage firms.
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foundation to the point the firms (rather than the investors) exit the industry (i.e.
cease to be independent entities).The route-maps capture the following events:
3.1.1 Foundation
Firms may be created with financial resource from a range of seed funders
(e.g. universities, charities, parent firms, business angels). Given the small amounts
involved at this stage, compared with the tens or even hundreds of millions invested
subsequently, we do not distinguish between these different kinds of early-stage
funders.
3.1.2 VC funds
SMEs receiving one or more rounds of funding from one or more formal VC funds,
as defined in Section 2, are counted as taking the VC route, regardless of the mix of
other investors that are present. Where the age at VC is taken, this refers to the age of
the firm on its first VC investment round. We do not classify funds created under the
UK Venture Capital Trust investment scheme Trusts as VC investors, despite their
name, as they distinct investment vehicles that are stock-market listed, open-ended
investment trusts which have more limited capital to invest in individual firms
(Siepel, 2009).
2
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5
2
0
5
10
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20
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Pharmaprojects (www.pharmaprojects.com)
Biotechnology/ Pharmaceutical trade directories (via British Library collection)
DMS News Analyser (www.newsanalyzer.com )
Biocentury (www.biocentury.com)
Library House (ceased trading in 2010)
BIA current members list (2009)  (www.bioindustry.org)
Dzidziso Kamuriwo (2009) PhD thesis – Firms from 1997 - 2007
IPTS, 2005 on Tissue Engineered Products
Martin et al., 2009; Rowley and Martin, 2009 on Regenerative medicine
Figure 2 Number of firms detected by founding year vs. publication years of data sources
used.
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3.1.3 Stock markets
A range of stock markets have supported the UK biotech firms. These are varied in
their funding capacity and stringency, but crucially unlike VC funds, stock markets
provide open access to a wide pool of potential investors, and are not time limited. A
firm that joins a stock market by any route (e.g. IPO event, or reverse merger with a
listed firm), and obtains funds from one or more public placing(s) is classified as
taking the stock market route.7
3.1.4 Alternative finance
Firms that have never had a VC funding round or offered shares through a public
placing on a stock market are categorized as taking the alternative funding route.
This broad category includes many types of equity investors such as business angels,
Pharma Venture Funds, and Venture Capital Trusts.
3.1.5 Pharmaceutical firms
Support often comes in terms of staged funding for specific drug projects in return
for licensing rights, rather than equity investment in a biotech firm per se (although
such investments are captured in “alternative investments” if no VC or stock market
investment occurs). Because such support is project specific, we track the contribu-
tion of pharmaceutical firms to individual projects (Table 1); however, we find equity
investment in biotech firms is relatively rare and is not shown in the funding route
maps.
3.1.6 Exit
The analysis tracks SMEs through their life cycles to the end of their time as inde-
pendent entities in the sector. We distinguish between mergers and acquisitions
(M&A), divestment from the UK sector, and failure. Where M&A occurs, junior
partners in mergers (549% of the resulting entity) are treated as ending their inde-
pendent existence. Contributions they make to continuing companies, such as drug
projects, are recorded using “family trees” (analogous to the approach of Hoang and
Rothaermel, 2010). Where firms leave the sector for other reasons, these are coded as
emigration or divestment.8 Few firms have taken this route and these are not
7This includes instances of firms (e.g. Senetek) moving from ‘public’ bulletin boards where buyers
and sellers are matched graduating to more formal markets such as NASDAQ or LSE or those
buying other listed firms to gain access to their stock market listing (e.g. Skyepharma). These events
may not initially raise funds, hence their stock market debut is not an ‘IPO’ and the number of IPOs
(events where new investors show their support for a firm) we show in the following sections differs
from the number of firms actually listed on stock markets substantially for this reason.
8A notable example is BioVex Ltd., which moved its operations to the USA before being acquired by
Amgen—a lucrative deal for investors.
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discussed further here. Finally, where firms have ceased trading, or entered liquid-
ation, they are recorded as “failed.”
All dates of significant events such as founding and failure are taken from notifi-
cations with the UK Government’s Companies House.9 Figure 3 sets out the available
data showing the quantitative differences in funding available to the firms obtaining
stock market, VC and alternative funding. All data on financing events shown is
reflated to 2010 Great British Pounds (GBP) using historic Consumers Prices Index
data to allow aggregation of data across periods. It is difficult to distinguish exact
amounts of funding accessed by small firms that are not subject to detailed statutory
filings required for larger firms. Although near complete data are available for stock
market firms, the mean investment shown in Figure 3 for VC and alternative firms is
likely to be artificially high as a result of reporting bias. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to
assume that firms accessing stock market funding are often able to raise the greatest
sums, typically tens or even hundreds of millions of pounds, which may be in addition
to substantial sums from VC investors, while firms accessing “alternative financing”
can typically only access a few million pounds (with a small number of exceptions).
3.1.7 Measuring success
We use the milestone of passing P.II clinical trials to capture “success” in thera-
peutics development. In light of difficulties in judging objectively whether firms
reporting P.II results actually achieved claimed successes, only drugs that have sub-
sequently advanced to the start of P.III or filed for market approval as orphan drugs
were counted as having completed P.II successfully (see Table 1 for full details of
firms and projects). P.II trials demonstrate therapeutic proof of concept in humans
and are associated with a “valuation inflection point” for drug candidates.
Development costs escalate steeply afterward, disfavoring small firms, and so this
is often thought to be the optimal time for small firms to out-license their projects
(Kalamas and Pinkus, 2003; Murray, 2012). Achievement of this milestone is re-
corded positively in the case of all firms in the data set that are associated with
advancing a project they own completely or partially, regardless of when the success
occurs in the life cycle of the firm involved (even if it is after acquisition of the UK
biotech firm that initially advanced the successful project). Data on the status of drug
projects was gathered from Pharmaprojects and public sources such as company
press releases. Using this measure, firms that advanced at least one project, which
(ultimately) passed P.II by the time of analysis (mid-2011) are classed as “successful”
irrespective of the profitability of such activities. The changing historical context
complicates comparative analysis of cohorts of firms (Freeman and Louc¸a˜, 2001),
and so to understand the influences on firms over the 30 years studied, we gathered
9It is noted that on occasion there are significant periods of time between announced events and
legal events, and where this is the case we follow the dates as recorded in Companies House.
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information from a range of contemporary sources including company statutory
filings, press releases, the financial press, more specialized sources (particularly
Nature Biotechnology, and Biocentury), as well as a series of the UK government
policy reports.
4. Funding patterns in the UK biotech
This section sets out the data on biotech firms’ funding routes with firms founded in
each decade tracked as a distinct cohort. Figures 4, 5, and 9 summarize the changing
use of different financing options by each cohort. The choices of funding routes are
contextualized by an account of institutional changes of the period 1980–2009.
4.1 The 1980s
Section 1 highlighted how established pharmaceutical firms and biotech SMEs have
become increasingly interdependent. However, in the past, there have been high
expectations of biotech SMEs, potentially displacing large incumbent pharmaceutical
firms (Kenney, 1986). Enthusiastic investors supported a dozen US biotech IPOs in
the early 1980s—dubbed biomania at the time (Teitelman, 1989). This optimism
provides the context for the initial foundation of 26 UK biotech firms in the 1980s
(Figure 4). During the early 1980s, the UK biotech SMEs only had domestic stock
market support from the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), a junior stock market
founded in 1983, as loss-making firms were not allowed to join the more prestigious
main list of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) (ibid).
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In their early years, these firms had limited support from institutional investors and
only two biotech firms had IPOs on the USM in this decade. The UK Government
founded Celltech in 1980, a biotech firm tasked with commercializing government-
funded R&D, which it was hoped would spur private sector investment (Owen, 2001).
Even as a private firm in the 1980s, Celltech had privileged access to institutional
investors such as The Midland Bank, and Prudential Assurance (a pension fund),
Venture Capital 
Alternave ﬁnance
Foundaons
Total: 129
Acquisions
Failed
Emigrated / 
Divested
Stock markets
tixEnoitadnuoF
= ﬁrms founded in 80s
= ﬁrms founded in 90s
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70
7,   20
7
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9
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Figure 5 The funding route of the UK therapeutics firms founded in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Figure 4 The funding route of the UK therapeutics firms founded in the 1980s.
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including the specialist fund Biotechnology Investments Ltd., which had initially been
founded to invest in US opportunities (Owen 2001). The investment environment
improved toward the end of the decade after the deregulation of the City of London in
1986 (Golding, 2001) and the subsequent growth of the UK VC sector. This is illu-
strated by membership of the British Venture Capital Association growing from 30 at
foundation in 1983 to over 100 in 1990 (Owen 2001). This increasingly favorable
funding environment saw more biotech firms emerge, with 19 founded from 1985–
1989 compared with only 7 between 1980 and 1984 (see Figure 7 below).
Improving access to stock market funding in the 1990s (discussed below) ultim-
ately meant that 65% or 17 of 26 of the cohort of firms founded in the 1980s
managed to access stock market funding (Figure 4) at some point (albeit not
during the 1980s). Of these, seven accessed the stock markets directly, while 10
out of 12 firms that accessed VC funding later joined a stock market. The remaining
seven (31%) relied on alternative sources of finance.
Considerable optimism surrounded these young firms. For example, executives at
Porton International, founded to exploit expertise in applied microbiology, saw the
firm as “another Glaxo” (referring to an established pharmaceutical firm) and
pharmaceutical executives took senior management roles in these firms (Owen,
2001). The firms founded in the 1980s were remarkably effective with 50% (12 of
the 24 for which we have data) ultimately advancing at least one of their therapeutic
assets beyond P.II trials (Table 1). Moreover, they seem to have been able to achieve
this success reasonably rapidly. Based on available data for the firm’s most advanced
project in the 10 firms for which we have data, we find it took an average of just over
9 years from founding to commencement of P.III clinical trials (Table 1).
In summary, the 1980s were a time of buoyant expectations for biotech firms, despite
significant uncertainties. Institutional investors increasingly supported biotech firms,
and while the UK VC sector was still relatively small, it played a greater role as it grew
and received more money from institutional investors. However, both biotech and VC
were poorly understood asset classes for London-based institutional investors. By the
end of the 1980s, the successes of the US firms and the growing access to funding in the
UK gave the 1980s cohort reasonable expectations of becoming large, fully integrated
firms. In retrospect, investment seems justified as several of this relatively small cohort
became billion pound firms, including Celltech, British Technology Group (BTG),
British Biotechnology, and Shire, although not sustainably so in all cases (Owen, 2001).
4.2 The 1990s
This section follows events in the 1990s and traces the continued efforts to seek
financing of the cohort of 1980s as well as the experiences of the emerging 1990s
cohort.
Figure 5 compares how the funding routes of the 103 firms founded in the 1990s
(shown in the darker lines) compare with the 26 founded in the 1980s. Greater use of
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a funding route is shown by thicker lines. In the early 1990s, several UK biotech firms
such as Cantab pharmaceuticals were unable to raise large amounts of capital in the
UK, and successfully listed on the US NASDAQ (Owen, 2001). Shortly afterward, the
LSE changed its rules to allow loss-making firms to join its list, and in 1992 British
Biotechnology was able to issue an LSE prospectus despite its loss-making status.
Biotech firms now had access to mainstream stockbrokers such as N.M. Rothschild,
Kleinwort Benson, and Robert Fleming & Co. These brokers were ultimately able to
arrange fund-raising placings of over £100 million (at 2010 prices) for some of their
new clients including British Biotech, Cambridge Antibody Technology (CAT),
Medeva, Oxford Glycosciences, and Skye Pharma, once they had established them-
selves on the stock market (i.e. after their IPOs).
The relaxing of the main list’s regulations as well as the launch of London’s
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in 1995 and the establishment in 1996 of
the pan-European EASDAQ (an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to replicate the
success of the US high-tech-friendly NASDAQ) provided important stimuli to the
sector by adding funding opportunities and signaling that the prospects of high value
exits for early-stage investors were improving. This was particularly favorable for the
emerging specialist life sciences funds set up by established and new VCs, including
Apax, Advent, Schroders, Abingworth, MVM Ventures, and Merlin Ventures. In the
relatively small UK sector, these dedicated funds had limited choice in investees and
in some cases these VCs would even found new biotech firms (rather than select
them from applicant firms). Given these supportive conditions, more biotech firms
were created than in the prior decade, and many of these eventually listed on a range
of stock markets (Figures 5 and 6).
Between 1990 and 1994, seven IPOs raised a total of £155 million. However,
between 1995 and 1999, this figure nearly trebled with 25 IPOs raising £456 million
(Figures 7 and 8). Much larger sums of money were available in secondary (follow-
on) placings through the stock market with nearly £2 billion raised in the 1990s by
the UK therapeutics-focused biotech SMEs. These relatively high IPO valuations
(discussed later in Section 5 and shown in Figure 11) rewarded early-stage investors
and spurred growth in the sector, particularly after the opening of AIM, with 83 new
firms founded between 1995 and 1999 compared with just 46 in the prior 15 years
(Figure 7). The benign funding environment helped increase the number of firms per
year receiving their first VC funding, which in turn sustained the growth of the
biotech SME sector over the next decade. These trends are shown in Figure 7,
which records the numbers of biotech SMEs receiving their first VC funding
rounds each year, as well as firm foundations per year, with the two lines closely
tracking each other. VC financing was more readily available in the 1990s, with 68%
(70) of 1990s SMEs receiving VC funding compared with 46% (12) of the 1980s
firms. Only 13 firms (13%) founded in the 1990s relied on the alternative finance
route, which given the capital available from other funders, can be taken as a sign of
relatively accessible finance in this decade. VC and institutional investors were not
926 M. M. Hopkins et al.
 at Sussex Language Institute on A
ugust 27, 2013
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
being particularly selective with a high proportions of firms founded obtaining VC or
stock market funding.
Although a lower proportion of 1990s firms (41% or 42 of 103) obtained a stock
market listing compared with 1980s firms (65% or 17 of 26), actual numbers where
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higher (42 vs. 17). Again, the majority of these arrived on the stock markets having
first had VC funding (22) although nearly as many (20) joined the stock market
without VC support. In a small number of cases, such as CeNeS and Skye Pharma,
firms used reverse takeovers of listed firms, rather than IPOs as a less expensive “back
door” onto the stock markets.
By the late 1990s a financial ecosystem had evolved based on a shared vision that
staged investments, through a succession of specialist investors, could be made to
work even in the absence of profitable UK biotech firms emerging onto the stock
market. As a result, a well-funded biotech sector was developing with early-stage
investors building firms at some scale for an investment market supported by insti-
tutional investors. Specialist life science VC funds, a small number of institutional
investment funds, and dedicated stock-brokering teams that included specialist fi-
nancial analysts were established. Firms founded during this period were again ap-
parently successful at developing products that ultimately passed P.II trials. By 2011,
24% (25 of 103) of the 1990s SMEs cohort had advanced at least one project beyond
P.II trials, with the average firm taking just over 6 years (based on data for 24 firms)
from founding to commencement of P.III trials (Table 1).
In the 1990s, the biotech SME sector’s loss-making (and sometimes productless)
stock market–listed firms were seen by the Financial Times to
“sustain capitalisations often running into hundreds of millions and regularly
raise new equity capital. This is possible for just one reason. Investors believe a
steady trickle of small losses is merely the prelude to a future flood of profits and
big dividends.” (Anon, 1998).
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The same phenomena had earlier shaped biotech in the USA, where Teitelman
reports the importance amongst stock brokers of “the will to believe. . . . One hot
[stock] issue would lead to the next and the next.” (Teitelman, 1989:47). Even though
stock issues were often small, there were enough of them to make it profitable for
brokers to support them (ibid). Data on 75 of 77 biotech firms on public markets
shows they undertook 320 placings between 1987 and 2009, which would have gen-
erated considerable income, as stock placing fees ran into the millions of pounds and
averaged 10% of funds raised. The brokers with the highest number of placings are
shown in Table 2 (as distinct from those raising the single largest amounts).
An important turning point in the history of the industry came in the late 1990s.
In 1997 “a string of share price collapses” occurred after firms suffered failures in
expensive late-stage P.III trials (Taylor, 1997). British Biotech PLC, the “flagship” of
the UK Biotech sector (peak stock market value £3 billion) became embroiled in a
scandal over an alleged cover-up of poor clinical results for key late-stage drug
candidates. Dresdner Klienwort Benson’s 1998 Biotech in Crisis report highlighted
an “annus horribilis” for the sector (Pilling, 1998).
The share-price falls that followed clinical failures, unexpected development
delays and board-level crises had lasting effects. For VC investors, late-stage failures
reduced stock market interest and so destroyed portfolio value in a relatively small
sector, where hedging risks was difficult. Due to the high time cost of capital, longer
investment periods holding stock before exit was not desirable as investments
became economically unviable. For other investors, and equity-owning founders,
VC’s desire for earlier exit was costly as it would require a sale before value inflection
points, in a thin-market where investor trust had been badly damaged. Both cases
had a lasting impact on the eventual returns the funds produced. For institutional
investors, the rapid and often unexpected drops in value had a disproportionate
effect on overall performance, both directly, for funds that held equity, and indir-
ectly, for funds that had invested in VC. As a consequence, institutional investor
support for large share placings waned and investors increasingly shunned biotech.
Moreover, as the impact on VC fund performance became evident over the following
years (in combination with poor investments during the dot.com boom), investment
in the UK VC similarly declined (Owen, 2001, Smith et al., 2009).10
One contemporary analyst noted that biotech is a field “investors find tough to
understand and where there were no 6 monthly profit figures against which to gauge
credibility or otherwise.” He continued: “Although the rewards look high, the levels
of risk is rarely appreciated by them or the stock brokers who advise them” (Anon,
1998). After suffering severe loses, institutional investors claimed they would not
reinvest (Pilling, 1998). This dried up the market and the leading brokers
10This narrative of biotech may look like a classic investment bubble, but this only occurred in the
UK, while in the USA institutional conditions continue to support an industry—indeed in some
years raising even more money than in the 1990s (Huggett et al 2011).
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(by quantum, not frequency of placing), mentioned above, ceased to support biotech
IPOs on the LSE after 1998.11 While others continued to invest, the belief that SMEs
could bring drugs successfully through clinical trials was increasingly questioned, and
investors shifted their attention to firms making deals with pharmaceutical partners
(Taylor, 1997; Pilling, 1998). These partnering deals provided the firms with much
needed additional cash, which was secured in exchange for a share of potential future
product revenues rather than further equity investments and signaled quality to other
investors (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 2007). This signaling is important because
institutional investors have limited understanding of smaller firms in specialist mar-
kets, which are too small for them to devote time to understand, and are not prof-
itable for many financial analysts to develop and sell research notes (ETB, 2006:14).12
Again, this highlights how the scale of the investee industry influences specialization
in investor industries.
The biotech firms that relied on pharmaceutical firms were now more exposed to
big pharma’s Chandlerian imperatives and their impact on internal decision making
about their own pipeline strategies. Large pharmaceutical firms do not seek to maxi-
mize the value of each individual project, but instead maximize the value of their
entire portfolio. As a result, they can make decisions that go against the interests of
biotech partners, such as to delay development or product launch or shelve projects
entirely. While milestone payments and capabilities from pharma may have helped
advance some biotech projects, other projects that do not fit well within the
Table 2 Most active brokers (by number of placings under-
taken involving the 77 firms in the data set)
Broker Number of placings
Collins Stewart 22
Nomura International PLC 21
Piper Jaffray 15
Panmure Gordon 13
Credit Suisse 11
11There was an argument at the time that biotech had not delivered, with a lack of therapeutic
successes compared with the US sector (Pilling 1998b). Various causes were advanced for this—
poor management, the wrong incentives, or insufficient capital (Smith et al. 2009).
12Paul Myners’ review of institutional investors for the UK Treasury noted in 2001 that ‘long-
established firms offer similar products and limited expertise in some important specialist areas,
including private equity’; in particular, he noted that there were difficulties for investors getting
investment advice, particularly on alternative investments p.40.
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pharmaceutical firm’s (changing) strategic decision making became less attractive,
and hence less attractive for biotech firms and their investors to invest in.
The 1990s cohort further suffered in the 2000s in the aftermath of the “dot.com”
stock market collapse, which cast a long shadow over the UK VC sector and in-
vestors’ interest in technology-based firms. As a consequence, fewer UK biotechs had
IPOs on the prestigious main list of the LSE (15 listed in the 1990s compared with
only 6 since 2000 and none have had an IPO since 2006, despite an overall growth in
the number of firms in the sector). The long-term trend, shown in Figure 8, is that
those biotech firms already listed sought more follow-on placings, but received less
cash per placing. By 2010, the 1980s cohort had raised, on average, £169 million each
from public markets, while the 1990s cohort raised £63.3 million and the 2000s
cohort just £18.9 million. Such a trend might be expected as the older firms have
had more time to raise funds. However, younger SMEs have also found it particularly
difficult to raise cash as the majority of stock market funding in each 5-year period
went to the 1980s cohort. As valuations and average IPO proceeds drop (Figures 8
and 11), the costs of accessing capital from stock markets increase, perhaps reflecting
investor concerns about the ability of small firms to create and capture value from
early-stage R&D.
In summary, during the 1980s support for biotechs was growing and those firms
founded then had continued support for most of the 1990s allowing them to invest in
a portfolio of projects and take some into late-stage trials, where (as might be ex-
pected in a high-risk industry) many failed, resulting in a collapse of share prices and
loss of investor confidence among the relatively unspecialized the UK fund manage-
ment community, compounded by more than one board-level scandal. As a result,
after 2000, we see reduced enthusiasm for biotech IPOs amongst institutional inves-
tors and reduced willingness to invest in VC funds, which also failed to generate good
returns in biotech (Bains, 2009). Moreover, the lack of interest in biotech IPOs
created lack of interest in VCs because it closed off a key exit market for their
investments. The poor performance of VC funds during the 2000s was revealed as
they shut down, and institutional investors’ expectations were soured (EBT, 2006;
NESTA, 2011). The relatively small size of VC funds, relative to the size of the typical
institutional investors’ investment, meant that it was rarely worthwhile for fund
managers to spend the time needed to understand the asset class (i.e. the behavior
of J-curves), and trust in external advisors had been substantially reduced by losses.
Failure could hit fund performance, which in turn, further discouraged interest from
institutional investors from funding VCs.13 With less institutional investor support,
13Ironically, some successful VCs left the sector too. As VC funds perform well, they attract more
funding and grow to the point where individual investments substantially exceeded the funding
requirements of start ups, creating an imperative to move into later stage, less risky Private Equity
investing (EBT 2006). The prime example of this is 3i, a prominent VC investor before 2010.
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biotech firms relied more on Pharmaceutical firms, which had implications for their
business models and funding.
4.3 The 2000s
This section follows events in the 2000s and continues to trace the efforts to obtain
financing of the cohorts founded in the 1980s and 1990s as well as those of the
emerging 2000s cohort.
The UK sector began the new millennium with a number of well-established
biotech firms that had either weathered clinical failures or not experienced them
(Owen, 2001). Thus, there was some optimism in the early 2000s as a joint industry-
government report suggests:
“UK companies are likely to prosper through different business models: Some
companies will reach profitability through block buster products. Others will
succeed by focusing on smaller products for niche indications . . . others will be
fully integrated companies. Some will focus on core areas of expertise in the drug
development process.” (BIGT, 2003).
The need for multiple rounds of funding even in “inevitable downturns” was highlighted
so that “finding and rewarding investors who understand the scientific and financial
risks involved in this enterprise is a critical challenge for the industry” (BIGT, 2003). This
was noted as problematic because the UK had fewer specialist investors, who invested
less during each funding round than their counterparts in the USA (BIGT, 2003). By the
end of the decade, the mood of BIGT’s next report changed considerably:
“There is a dearth of funding for emerging biotechnology companies from private
sector finance sources. This results from the failure of most biotech companies to
produce the returns needed by their investors to make the long term risks involved.
[. . .] investors being increasingly reluctant to invest in emerging bioscience com-
panies, the public markets all but closing down” (BIGT, 2009: 3–4).
The cohort of SMEs founded in the 2000s experienced a deteriorated funding envir-
onment particularly from the stock markets. For example, the AIM traded–biotech
firms’ lost value relative to the index of all AIM companies continuously after reaching
a peak in 2003 (Andersson et al., 2010). As funding declined, brokerages, such as Piper
Jaffray, disbanded their specialist teams covering the therapeutics sector, or gave their
analysts a wider range of sectors to research (Mishkin, 2010; Smith et al., 2009).
Emerging firms had to compete with more established biotech firms for funding
(as noted above), and found it more difficult to maintain investor interest. This
constrained liquidity, which meant investors were even more reluctant to invest for
fear of being unable to exit, further reducing demand for the stock, therefore affecting
the market value of the firms. Biotech firms caught in this liquidity trap and unable to
raise funding are referred to as the “living dead” at biotech networking events. This
stands in marked contrast with more buoyant markets where liquidity is provided by
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deeper-pocketed and more knowledgeable investors as is the case to the situation in
the USA—or alternatively, some suggest, the principle applies that there is always a
“greater fool” to buy stock off the incumbent investor (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011).14
Despite these problems, Figure 9 shows VC continued to invest, with start-ups still
receiving VC support (49% or 58 of 118). However, far fewer firms have accessed
stock market funding so far (15% or 18 firms, 13 of which moved directly to the
stock market, while 5 first obtained VC funding). A notable consequence is that
many more of the 2000s SME cohort relative to prior cohorts, followed the alterna-
tive finance route (40% or 47 firms), which we highlighted earlier in Figure 3, pro-
vides less capital and, as we discuss in the next section, these firms are less likely to
produce P.II trial passes. While some of these firms may access VC or stock market
funding in the future, that is unlikely to effect the overall trend as they are already48
years old on average, substantially older than the average age of 1.2 years at which 43
of their (equivalent 2000–2004) cohort peers obtained VC funding. We highlight this
as a substantial shift in financier and biotech SME behavior.
Moreover, it appears that the alternative funding route is associated with much
lower levels of capital and increased risks of failure with 9 of 67 firms (13%) taking
this route having ceased to trade by 2010. This is higher than the 10% (11 of 103) of
all firms that accessed VC only or the 6% (5 of 77) of all firms that accessed stock
market investment. Although still relatively young, 3% (3 of 118) of firms founded in
the 2000s have managed to advance a project beyond P.II, from founding in 6.5 years
(on average), but all three projects were reformulations of existing drugs rather than
novel molecules (Table 1).The disappointing performance of VC funds and biotech
in the 2000s may partly be self-fulfilling, as lack of funding has a negative impact on
biotech performance and hence on VC returns (Bains 2009).15 Although it may be
tempting to blame short-termism, this does not explain why the City of London
moved from biotech to mining stocks in the resource boom in the late 2000s, which
are also high risk and can take years to become profitable. The difference may be the
scale of the relative industries, with institutional investors unprepared to invest the
time needed to understand complex and risky areas of investment that are small (and
illiquid) compared with the average size of their portfolio.
14Not to underestimate the difficulties of being a micro-cap US biotech firm, but overall the US
sector (including therapeutic and non-therapeutic biotech) has moved into profitability in recent
years, even after the removal from the sector’s balance sheet of a number of successful firms bought
out often in highly profitable acquisitions (Huggett et al., 2010). Again this illustrates the UK bust
was not an inevitable feature of a tech bubble with no underpinning of therapeutic promise.
15Explaining why this dynamic has worked differently (generally more profitably) in the USA is
beyond the scope of this article, although because the logic of this article is on economies of scale
and scope we tend toward this. Other factors also come into play—such as the suggestion that
Institutional investors and VC work more closely in the USA (EBT 2006) and that US biotech firms
benefit from higher valuations, which in turn allows them to build more aggressive businesses
(Critical-I 2006, Bains 2006).
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During the late 2000s, the IPO market was much less appealing due to lower
valuations, and with less frequent opportunities to exit, the importance of trade sales
as an exit option increased (see Figure 8 and later “Discussion” section). However,
contrasting Chandlerian imperatives are at work in this market as well. VC investors
seek their returns in time windows that are short relative to the drug development
process. Hence they can encourage early trade sales before biotech firms have been
able to develop their assets through key clinical trials. Furthermore, during negoti-
ations for trade sales, pharmaceutical firms can take advantage of time-sensitive VCs
and cash poor biotechs by extending negotiations to drive down acquisition prices
and constraining firms’ other options.
4.4 CAT as a micro-level view of fundings’ impact
Cambridge Antibody Technology (CAT) provides a case in point, as its experiences
show how stock markets and pharmaceutical firms are pricing biotech firms at levels
that make it difficult to create attractive returns. CAT was founded in 1989 to develop
humanized monoclonal antibody technology from the UK’s Medical Research Council’s
Molecular Biology Lab in Cambridge. After several years of relatively low investor
funding, CAT had its IPO on the LSE in 1997 (later listing on NASDAQ), raising
over £155 million (in 2010 GBP) from stock market investors, plus over £100 million
in equity from commercial partners during its independent existence. This funding
allowed it to become a leading therapeutic monoclonal antibody firm. It initially
worked on multiple projects with a range of partner firms, effectively hedging CAT
against the risks of late-stage trials. One of these collaborations yielded the world’s first
fully human monoclonal antibody, Humira, which was subsequently a blockbuster
product for Abbott, the US-based large pharmaceutical firm.
Venture Capital 
Total: 140
Ongoing: 50
Alternave ﬁnance
Total: 67
Ongoing: 43
Foundaons
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Acquisions
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Total:25
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Stock markets
Total: 77
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Figure 9 The funding route of the UK therapeutics firms founded in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
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CAT then changed its strategy to develop its own product portfolio and in 2004 it
established a substantial codevelopment programme with AstraZeneca, who took a
20% equity stake in CAT (Dickinson, 2004). Despite its successes, CAT struggled to
maintain its stock market valuation, even as rival US antibody firms were acquired. As
a result, when CAT’s investors received a takeover offer from AstraZeneca in 2006, they
accepted. Several analysts suggested AstraZeneca overpaid for the 80% of CAT (£567
million) it did not own16 but AstraZeneca quickly sold the Humira royalty stream to
Royalty Pharma for $616m (£416 million), which when added to the £162 million
that CAT had in cash at acquisition, meant that within a year AstraZeneca paid out
£567 million and gained £578 million, effectively picking up CAT’s capabilities and
280 staff, clinical pipeline, and ongoing alliance deals for nothing.
According to traditional metrics, CAT’s directors and advisors did not sell too
low: The offer represented a 67% premium to CAT share price before the announce-
ment, compared favorably with comparator deals, and was toward the top end of a
discounted cash flow analysis undertaken by CAT’s advisors. As the second highest
value UK buyout over the 30-year period studied, CAT illustrates that by 2006
investors were not being rewarded with valuations of significantly more than was
captured in the firm’s cash and near-term tangible assets (Booth, 2009 has also
observed this in second tier US biotech firms too).17 This raises questions about
the viability of long-term investment, which in turn can be expected to reduce
valuations further and encourage firms’ management to seek alternatives to public
markets. However, as the next section highlights, in the long run, opportunitistic
behavior that may be rational for individual pharmaceutical firms (exemplified here
by AstraZeneca’s quick turn of profit in the CAT acquisition) may be detrimental to
a sector hoping to increasingly work with biotech firms to develop drugs, if biotech
investing is not profitable for the wider range of supporting investors.
5. Comparing R&D performance of financing strategies
over time
While biotech firms’ financing patterns have changed over time, it is not clear if these
changes to the frequency of funding routes used (Figure 9) have affected the ability of
the sector to produce drugs. Comparing the timing of project milestones with
16Etain Lavelle (2006) Astrazeneca Agrees to buy partner : http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid¼newsarchive&sid¼akW7WEshrRKY&refer¼europe and anon (2006) at http://www.zenopa.
com/news/17117789/AstraZeneca__overpaid_for_Cambridge_Antibody_Technology_
17Another interpretation is that the remaining parts of CAT were not worth much but we reject this
as in the years since AstraZeneca bought CAT, it has increased the staffing at CAT’s Cambridge site
from 284 (2006) to 484 (2010), and at least four MAbs originating in CAT are currently under
clinical development at AstraZeneca.
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financing milestones can be used to explore whether a funding source was accessed
before a firm’s first development project successfully passed P.II (as in Table 1).
Table 3 brings together data from Table 1 (showing firms with 1 project that has
passed P.II trials) with funding route data for the remaining firms that did not have a
successful P.II trial (as reported in 2011, and shown in Figure 9). This tabulation in
Table 3 is necessary and helpful because a number of firms obtained VC funding
sufficient to generate P.II trial passes before going on to stock markets (e.g. Celltech
and Shire Pharmaceuticals).
Of all 247 UK firms, 17% (42 of 247) had at least one project that ultimately
generated a successful P.II result (by mid-2011). Sufficient data from company re-
ports was found to reconstruct the histories of 40 of 42 SMEs to ascertain the funding
sources that they accessed before achieving the milestone of their first P.II pass. The
40 firms and their initial projects (detailed in Table 1)18 can be normalized by the
relative number of firms that followed each funding route to provide an approximate
indicator of success. Thus, 27.5% (11 of 39) of the firms that were only funded by the
stock market were successful, 39% (14 of 36) of the firms that were funded by both
VC and the stock market were successful, while only 10% (10 of 103) of the VC only
and 7% (5 of 67) of the alternative investment route firms produced a product that
eventually passed P.II trials.
While informative, care must be taken in interpreting the results because the large
number of young firms in the population (which are less likely to have had time for
their drug projects to pass P.II trials) are also less likely to have obtained stock
market funds and are more likely to be associated with VC investors. We therefore
focus on the 127 firms that were founded in the 1980s and 1990s. This provides 37
cases with sufficient data to track development (leaving out 3 firms founded in the
2000s that had developed P.II successes and 115 that did not but that it may be
deemed too early to include). Focusing only on firms founded before 2000 allows a
minimum of 12 years to elapse between founding and the time of analysis (average
development time across all cases in Table 1 is 7.3 years), which is enough to com-
pare the funding routes of the 37 successful firms against their 90 unsuccessful cohort
peers (data shown in Table 3) using a Pearson 2 test for unexpected differences
between numbers of firms achieving P.II success following each funding route (i.e.
deviations from a distribution of successful firms proportionate on each funding
route to the number of firms taking that funding route). The results of this analysis
(Figure 10) do show a distribution that is significantly different enough (P 0.002)
to reject a null hypothesis that no funding route is associated with higher than
expected success in generating therapeutic projects. Thus Figure 10 shows firms
18The two excluded firms were Biocompatibles (supported by the stock market only) and
Powderject (supported by VC and then the stock market). These are not counted as successes or
failures in the charts and tables in this section or in the statistical analysis, due to this lack of data,
hence Tables record 245 firms of the 247 discussed elsewhere.
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supported only by VC achieved a P.II trial pass less frequently than expected (8
observed vs. 16.3 expected), while VC-backed firms subsequently joining the stock
market produce more than expected (7 expected, 13 observed) as did firms with
Stock Market support but no VC (7.9 expected and 11 observed).
As noted in Section 4, biotech firms have the option to use strategic deals with
pharma as a substitute for investor equity.19 It is therefore notable that of the 11
stock market-funded firms that were successful in supporting a project that passed P.
II trials, only one required support from a commercial alliance partner and all
remained independent entities until completion of their first P.II (Table 1).
Similarly, of the 14 firms that received both VC and stock market funding, only 4
were involved in alliances to support their lead project, and all remained independent
entities until after their P.II pass was achieved. However, of the 10 firms in Table 1
that produced P.II successes having only received VC funding, 3 required alliance
support and a further 3 only managed to achieve a project success after they were
acquired. Similarly, with the five successful firms following the alternative funding
5
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13
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11
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15
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48
39.7
11
17
16
19.1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Observed
Expected
Observed
Expected
Observed
Expected
Observed
Expected
A
lt
VC
 O
nl
y
VC
 ->
 S
M
 
SM
Frequency of firms
0 Projects passed P.II
≥1 Projects passed P.II
Figure 10 Comparison of observed vs. expected frequency of 127 firms founded 1980–1999
with and without successful therapeutics project, showing significance (P¼ 0.002) using
Pearson 2 test.
19As noted in Section 3, these deals are not generally equity-investments and so are considered
separately rather than as a distinct funding route option as operationalized for the analysis in the
funding route maps such as Figure 9, and the tracing of firms with P.II successes shown in Table 3
and Figure 10. It should also be noted that a limiting factor of Pearson 2 tests where the population
being tested is relatively small is that the expected number of observations in each outcome category
must not be below 5 (Figure 10 shows four funding routes, with two outcomes for each). This rule
would have been violated in the above analysis with the inclusion of any additional categories and
was a further reason to consider separately the role of pharmaceutical funding from funding by VC,
stock market, and ‘alternative’ equity investors.
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route, two were successful only after acquisition, one relied on support from an
alliance, while another, Ineos, is the UK’s largest private equity backed firm, leaving
only one (Devco) that managed to reach a P.II success alone without an acquirer or
alliance partner (we return to Devco’s success later on).
Analysis of the funding routes taken by “successful” firms in Table 1 shows that
those benefiting from access to stock market investments were more likely to suc-
ceed, and more likely to do so independently of help from larger strategic partners
(whether large pharma or biotechs). Firms without stock market funding have either
not been successful or have generally relied more on strategic alliances to access
funding. While correlation is not causation, and there are clear challenges in ascrib-
ing causality here (which we return to in Section 6), the link between our metric of
success and earlier injections of cash from stock market funding suggests this form of
funding is associated with significantly higher likelihood of success in getting at least
one project passed P.II trials. The next section explores how reduced entry to the
stock market has changed the prospects for biotech firms.
5.1 Strategic responses to the changing funding environment
Changes in the values that different types of investor were prepared to put on biotech
firms has led to a marked change in strategies in the sector. This is illustrated in
Figure 11, which shows the valuations that different 5-year cohorts of firms achieved
from IPOs and trade sales for all the transactions where data are publically available.
Because older firms have had more time to generate value, the IPO and trade sale
valuations are divided by the age of the firm to facilitate comparisons in Figure 11,
which suggests firms founded before 2000 enjoyed higher stock market valuations
relative to trade sale prices, while the reverse has been the case since 2000.
These higher trade sale values explain why biotech firms have shifted away from
stock market exits in recent years, as shown by fewer IPOs in Figure 7 and fewer
firms moving to the stock markets in Figure 9 (see also, Ernst and Young, 2010:5;
Booth, 2009). The number of trade sales are up sharply in firms founded after 1995,
and a sizable proportion (27% or 16 of 60) of the VC-backed firms in the 2000s
cohort have achieved a trade sale to date. Although532% (22 of 68) of VC-backed
firms founded in the 1990s, there is still time for this to rise. Both 1990s and 2000s
cohorts are more likely to be sold than the 17% (2 of 12) of VC-backed firms from
the 1980s cohort.
Figure 12 shows the compression of the funding cycle with more firms being sold
below 10 years after the 1980s, and recently more firms being bought at55 years of
age. This may reflect the increasing difficulty of obtaining the funding required to
remain independent and/or VC investors’ increased focus on “asset centric” business
models that use less capital and more outsourcing to bring a single project to key
milestones as fast as possible (Ernst and Young, 2010; Booth, 2009).
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When the differences between the mean ages of firms (at acquisition) taking
different funding routes are examined, a significant difference was found between
firms taking stock market routes (both with and without prior VC) and VC-only
firms (see results of the ANOVA test in Figure 13).20 This result indicates that firms
with stock market backing exist independently significantly longer than firms that
have VC support and no stock market funding, and therefore, with the UK stock
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Figure 11 Age-adjusted value at sale from stock market or trade sale of the UK therapeutics
firms.
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Figure 12 Percentage of 5-year founding cohorts bought before 10 years of age.
20Of 40 firms VC-backed firms sold, the average age at acquisition was 7.2 years; for the 26 stock
market backed firms it was 12.5 years, it was 11.5 years for the 15 VC and stock market backed firms;
12.5 years for the 11 firms that moved directly to the stock market; and 6.6 years for the 12 firms
following the alternative financing route.
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market investment declining, firms sold by VCs or alternative investors had nearly 5
years less time to reach project milestones and valuation inflection points before the
firm lost its independence to an acquirer. Moreover, the frequency of early-stage
acquisitions is increasing (Figure 12).
Diminishing years of independence for biotech firms is an important change
because different business models vary in the amounts of time they take to get
products passed P.II trials. For example, Devco in-licensed a drug that had already
been advanced by British Biotech for another indication, and completed early-stage
trials just 1.5 years after founding, while Allergy Therapeutics was spun out of
Smithkline Beecham, an established pharmaceutical firm, and rapidly took its
spin-out vaccine projects into late-stage trials. At the other extreme, Prolifix’s
novel anti-cancer molecule entered P.III trials 16.5 years after Prolifix was founded,
and48 years after its acquisition by biotech firm Topotarget. The 37 firms for which
we have data took an average of 7.3 years from founding to get their first product
passed P.II, which given that the average firm sold by VC is only 7.2 years old,
suggests VC investors have often not been able to wait for valuation inflection
points unless they (like pharma) move their focus to later-stage development. This
problem may become more acute given increasing drug development times
(Pammolli et al., 2011).
6. Discussion
The findings in the previous sections highlight how the structure of financial insti-
tutions and their contexts creates Chandlerian imperatives—such as rapid returns for
VC    
(7.2)
SM 
(12.5)
VC->SM 
(11.5)
Alt     
(6.6)
VC   
(7.2)
-0.54* -0.50* 0.05
SM 
(12.5)
0.54* 0.04 0.59
VC->SM 
(11.5)
0.50* -0.04 0.55
Alt (6.6) -0.05 -0.59 -0.55
Figure 13 Matrix showing the difference in mean of the age (real values in years are shown in
brackets) at acquisition of firms, categorized by funding route. Results from an ANOVA
(on logAge), with a Bonferroni post hoc test (statistically significant differences indicated by
asterisk, p=50.05).
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VC, and for large, liquid, predicable investments for institutional investors. These
have implications that cut across sectors. Cross-sector Chandlerian imperatives mean
these various financial institutions interact in systemic ways, between each other and
the biotech sector they fund. These interactions must generate a coherent funding
system to support successful drug R&D while maintaining the scale and flow of
investments and returns needed to keep its individual parts operating at minimum
efficient scales. Coherence does not necessarily mean the system should be structured
in a single way; for example, it is possible to spread project-associated risks by having
large firms (e.g. large pharma) with many drug projects owned by many investors or
conversely many firms with few drug projects (e.g. biotech) owned by few investors,
as long as the scale of the combined sectors is sufficiently large for investors and
biotech managers to devote resources to developing the expensive skills to manage
the risks involved.
Looking over the period 1980–2009, our analysis shows how scale was pursued in
the relatively new biotech sector by both VC and institutional investors, with the
result that there were high investment rates in emerging biotech firms. With both
these groups investing, the UK biotech firms accessed large amounts of money over a
long period allowing 12 of 25 of the 1980s cohort to achieve at least one P.II trial
milestone. Firms enjoying the longest support from investors were those listed on
stock markets and these were disproportionately represented in the group of firms
with successful drug projects (25 of 40 cases). Some of these (11 of 40 cases) even
achieved success without VC funding. This is not to suggest that stock markets are
intrinsically better at supporting biotech therapeutic success. Indeed the publicly
listed biotech model has been criticized as broken even in the USA (Pisano, 2006).
Instead, we stress the highly effective combination of relatively large-scale investment
over long periods, which seems to be key for progress in clinical trials, even if the
fruits are realized after the sponsoring firm’s acquisition. Recent thinking in the
investment community suggests that as hurdles to innovation grow, even larger
and longer term investment funds than are seen at present in the USA may be
needed to support drug R&D in the future (Fernandez et al., 2012).
Our analysis suggests the scale of investment in the UK was, however, relatively
low both compared with the size of the investment portfolios of institutional in-
vestors in the UK and also the scale of pharmaceutical R&D. To illustrate this, the
entire population of publicly traded UK firms raised around £5.7 billion up to 2010
(counting all placings over £1 million at 2010 GBP and including shares bought by
corporate partners). This is less than the £5.9 billion Glaxo SmithKline, the UK’s
largest pharma company, made in operational profit in 2009 alone. Moreover, Glaxo
SmithKline is one of two UK large pharma (AstraZeneca, discussed above, being the
other), each of which has an institutional share holding that would dwarf the UK
SME biotech sector. Such relatively low levels of investment in early-stage technol-
ogy-based firms have been discussed previously in the UK (BVCA-NESTA, 2009;
ETB, 2006; BIGT, 2009) and run the risk of creating a self-fulfilling situation where
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investors will not invest because growth is poor and growth is poor because investors
will not invest (see also, Bains, 2006; Smith et al., 2009).
The analysis presented points to an explanation of the relative performance of the
UK and US biotech sectors in terms of institutional structures, timing, and scale.
Early US investors supported a small number of firms that were able to generate
returns at the outset of the industry and that stimulated a virtuous cycle of invest-
ment driven by specialist investors who could understand and hedge against the
failures of a high-risk sector. The biotech SME-friendly funding system that emerged
has become robust enough to keep investing as the sector transformed over time,
even returning to support biotech IPOs in the wake of the “dot.com” and “sub-
prime” financial crashes (Huggett et al., 2010).
The UK also hosted various financial innovations to support biotech investment,
such as specialist VC funds, sector-specific analysts, junior stock markets, and
changes to rules creating exemptions for loss making firms to access capital markets.
However, despite these institutions that apparently mirrored the US investment
system, as well as initial expectations and investment levels being high, the UK
funding escalator was sensitive to a series of failures in the 1990s. The scale of the
sector was (and remains) too small to make it worth institutional investors spending
the time needed to understand it, and the UK VC sector (also young compared with
its US cousin) is relatively small by both size of the industry and size of individual
funds (BVCA/NESTA, 2009). After an initial period of investment did not provide
institutional investors with the returns they were seeking, they reduced their invest-
ment and the system lost momentum (BIGT, 2009; Smith et al., 2009). With less time
and money available, biotech firm managers have made strategic choices about which
projects to pursue, (e.g. increasing attention on reformulations rather than novel
drugs), and focused on early trade sales rather than developing the P.II assets sought
by large firms.21 With investors increasingly unwilling to take on the risks of produ-
cing P.II assets, pharmaceutical will not be able to rely so much on the UK SMEs to
develop late-stage assets, at precisely the time that they are trying to outsource early-
stage development to biotech firms.
6.1 Alternative view points and further research
There are of course a number of explanations that are consistent with any data, and
hence other explanations for why the stock market-backed firms from the 1980s and
1990s were more successful than their unlisted, privately held peers. Firstly, their
early success in obtaining funding may have stimulated a “bandwagon” of less
21For example, the projects advanced into late-stage trials by the 1980s cohort of firms included six
biologics, four small molecule drugs, and three reformulations/drug delivery systems. For the 1990s
cohort, this has changed to 7 biologics, 8 small molecule drugs, 10 reformulations/ drug delivery
systems, and 1 tissue-based project, while for the 2000s cohort all three successes at time of analysis
(in 2011) are reformulations.
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capable entrepreneurs, who diluted the performance of the sector over time. Given
that investors were not selective (a high proportion of firms entering the sector
obtained VC and/or stock market funds) this seems credible. However, countervail-
ing learning and networking effects (by investors and “recycled” entrepreneurs)
might also be expected to lead to superior performance.
An alternative, or even potentially complementary, explanation is that the early
firms captured “low-hanging fruit,” or since the 1980s existing (off-patent) drugs
made R&D less profitable as it made it harder to find high-value markets (see
Scannell, 2012 for a critique of these ideas). However, we note that here too coun-
tervailing forces need to be accounted for as new markets have emerged because of
institutional changes, such as Orphan drug legislation, and economic and demo-
graphic changes, as well as scientific advances that open new therapeutic avenues.
We have not controlled for the disease or technical focus of unsuccessful firms but
note that a shift to higher risk drug projects in the global industry as a whole (re-
ported by Pammolli et al., 2011) seems to have been underway during the period
studied, and that this risk has not put off continued large-scale investments by a
range of investors in the US sector (Huggett et al., 2011).
One explanation that might explain why stock market–backed firms succeed more
often than other firms is that generalist stock market investors are better at picking
investment opportunities than specialist VCs. This is controversial, as VCs are meant
to play an essential role as “talent scouts, advisors, consultants, and financiers”
(Powell, 1998; BVCA-NESTA; 2009), but this warrants further investigation, given
the performance of European VCs (Bains, 2009) and the lack of selectivity in VC
investments we highlight above (recall that 140 of 247 firms had some level of VC
backing). Lastly, it may just be that while the UK firms perform well technically
(given the remarkably high proportion that developed P.II drugs), they are just not as
good as US firms from a commercial perspective, and have been unable to generate a
decent return for their investors. However, this tautological suggestion restates the
problem without providing an explanation of why this might be the case. While we
advance the argument here that larger scale and longer duration of investment bene-
fits the performance of both biotech firms and sectors overall, we also note that the
alternative explanations above leave important avenues open for future research.
7. Conclusion
We set out to explore how the UK biotech firms have been financed, whether finance
affects their performance, and how changes in R&D and finance influence the struc-
ture of the UK sector. During the period covered, the importance of different in-
vestors and the scale of funding they provided has varied significantly, with firms
founded in the 1980s receiving more opportunity to raise high levels of stock market
funding and more likely to achieve a successful P.II trial result. In later periods,
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access to stock market funding declined. As a result, biotech firms significantly
compressed their life cycles and changed their business models to support, rather
than attempt to displace, large pharmaceutical firms and reduce the need to access
stock market funding. However, firms funded solely by VC have had less likelihood
of contributing to projects that pass P.II trials.
We argue that the experience of the UK provides a concrete example of how
financialization affects firm behavior, strategies, and chances of success in a context of
multiple investor groups. We show how investor organizations’ structures and con-
texts can, in some instances, generate Chandlerian imperatives that influence how
they interact with firms in other sectors and help explain why short-term investments
might be favored, for example, by VC funds that need to make returns rapidly given
the high time cost of capital involved, and limited life time of individual
funds. Hence it can be rational for them to exit investments earlier than other
equity investors might like. We have seen how initial optimism and the need for
scale tempted investors joining a small emerging sector, to forgo selective investment
strategies, instead backing a high proportion of overall new entrants. Only once it
was realized that biotech was not producing the returns they expected did interest
decline, leaving investee firms to adapt their business models to the new funding
environment.
These biotech SMEs became more dependent on their alliance partners or ac-
quirers (often pharmaceutical firms) to take therapeutic assets to P.II trials. While
large pharmaceutical firms at an industrial level may be keen to access R&D projects
from biotech firms to address their productivity problems, individually they have
little short-term incentive to see biotech firms profit from such deals. Without access
to deep-pocketed investors as a counterbalance, it seems that while the “locus of
innovation” may now be networks of new and established firms, rather than the
older integrated firms alone (Powell et al., 1996), when SMEs license projects to these
partners “the locus of power” still resides with big pharma, with implications for
biotech’s profitability (Baum et al., 2010: p.14).
In this way, we see how the Chandlerian imperatives of distinct groups of firms
can conflict if they are not well balanced. Lack of stock market capital has reduced
the time and financial resources available to UK biotech firms seeking to bring
projects to late-stage development. Reduced support has made the sector less
viable and in turn, it has become of less relevance for many investors. It would be
simplistic to suggest stock market investment is the only way to support successful
biotech firms—and they can be mercurial and unreliable sources of capital (Lerner,
2012). However, we suggest that funding routes that provide larger amounts of time
and money than VC and “alternative” route investors in the UK typically offer are
clearly required for successful drug discovery. Some have suggested that innovative
funding strategies will create more capital-efficient firms, but for all the possibilities
for survival in a “brave new world” of post-IPO biotech, new business models and
“open innovation” (Booth, 2009; Ernst and Young, 2011, Hughes, 2009; Lessl and
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Khusru, 2010), in view of the UK’s historic performance at least, the lack of investor
support suggests more firms will be sold early, without advanced clinical assets.
The UK’s experience may provide important lessons for other regions, as the UK
had the largest SME-based therapeutics pipeline in Europe, a large and sophisticated
financial sector and a strong domestic science base to support new firms (BIS, 2010;
BIGT, 2009). While many countries are attempting to build biotech sectors, the UK
experience raises questions about the viability of many smaller SME-based drug
discovery and financing ecosystems where there are too few potential transactions
for specialist investors to ensure selection of only high-quality opportunities and
insufficient scale to warrant development of complementary domestic financial in-
novations such as specialist funds and stock market rules. Under these conditions,
Big pharma may find that in the long run sourcing drugs externally from biotech
firms does not boost their R&D productivity because VC and institutional invest-
ment is insufficient outside the USA. If this is the case more generally, then the
emerging question for investors, big pharma and SME managers, policymakers, and
scholars of technological change alike is now “who will pay for early-stage thera-
peutic R&D?”
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